System integrity is destroyed because calibration test results can be deleted, said Girard.

He explained that a calibration check can be run to see if a machine is operating accurately. If it is not, the test can be erased from memory and not be recorded in ADAMS, Girard said.

Failed test results can vanish, the machine can be repaired, and a later accurate test can be performed and stored in ADAMS to show the IR5000 was working accurately before the earlier repair, explained Girard.

The above scenario would not reveal service disruptions in the IR5000, and failed calibration tests would never be discovered by defense attorneys. The IR5000's calibration records would never be questioned, according to Girard.

Accordingly, Girard believes records in the ADAMS database are biased, compromised, and inherently unscientific.

ADAMS lacks scientific integrity because it tolerates destruction of failed calibration results. This thwarts discovery of machine repairs and errors that might otherwise justify suppression of breath test results, Girard wrote.

Girard’s investigation of the Phoenix Crime Lab shows only a single record of a failed calibration test before an IR5000 machine repair was performed, he said.

It is PCL’s practice to produce calibration tests performed after machine repairs, said Girard. There seem to be no records of troubled calibration tests before repairs, he said.

In his court motion, Girard wrote, "Apparently there are no records, in recent times, of any failed calibration tests performed by PCL quality assurance specialists on an IR5000, with the exception of May 4, 1997 ... ."

The import is clear, according to Girard. If the government selects the calibration entries made and stored, then no calibration test is scientifically reliable because the results can be selectively controlled, he said.

"If the state can destroy calibration test results at the only point in time when they can be retained and recorded, how reliable or valid can the ADAMS database be?" Girard asked.  "How long can the IR5000 be tolerated as accurate?" he asked.

Girard believes Sanchez stands for the proposition that a breath testing machine, procedure, or methodology that is not scientifically reliable cannot yield evidence upon which a jury can base criminal liability.

Under Sanchez, does the mere presence of switch 11 interfere with a defendant’s fair chance to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence at the only time it is available?

In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "...nothing ... requires a ... court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered."

In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer wrote, ". . . a trial judge, acting as a ‘gatekeeper,’ must "‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.’

Shriki admitted that reliability of IR5000 results will always be based upon the ethics and the integrity of the machine’s operators.